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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Court has requested that briefs of amici
curiae address whether an employer may, consistent
with Section 152A of Chapter 149 of the General Laws,
impose a no-tipping policy at his establishment, not
only effectively discouraging patrons from leaving
tips for his wait staff employees but also actually
prohibiting employees from accepting tips.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amici adopt the Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts as presented by Mr. Ron Meshna and
the other Plaintiff-Appellants.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
No-tipping policies are prohibited by the
Massachusetts Tips Act, Mass. Gen. ch. 149, §152A
(hereinafter "Tips Act"). No provision of the Tips Act
can be construed to permit employers to enact
workplace rules that place covered workers beyond the
reach of a law intended to protect their right to
receive tips customarily offered to them by patrons.
See Mass . Gen. Laws ch. 149, §152A(a)

(establishing

that tips are "given [by patrons] as an acknowledgment
1

of any service performed by a wait staff employee,
service employee, or service bartender"). Pp. 9-11
No-tipping policies are inconsistent with the
Tips Act's definition of tips, which indicates that
tips are a portion of covered employees' wages that
are determined by a voluntary social norm, to wit, the
custom of tipping. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149,
§152A(a)

(tips are "given [by patrons] as an

acknowledgment of any service performed by a wait
staff employee.

."). A construction of the Tips Act

that makes the receipt of patron tips covered workers
"employer-optional" would impermissibly require this
Court to add words to the statute that the Legislature
did not include and to disregard the Legislature's
considered judgment that this law be interpreted
sensibly. Pp. 11-16.
Employer-imposed no-tipping policies cannot be
squared with the express terms of §152A(g}, which
states that "[n]o employer or person shall by a
special contract with an employee or by any other
means exempt itself from this section." Scrivanos'
tipping-ban is a special contract that unlawfully
exempts its establishments from complying with the
Tips Act. Neither the Defendants nor the Superior
2

Court below referenced or attempted to reconcile
employer no-tipping policies with §152A(g), which was
designed by the Legislature to thwart a wide range of
employer schemes that are put in place to avoid
compliance with or to create an "end run" around the
Tips Act. Defendants are asking this Court, in effect,
to amend the Tips Act. That is clearly a prerogative
of the Legislature. Pp. 18-23.
This Court should reject the argument that notipping policies are a rational business response to
some customers who find tipping contrary to their
personal viewpoint. First, this rationale for
instituting a no-tipping policy ignores record facts
showing that many customers at Defendants' Dunkin'
Donuts stores favored tipping and exercised their
right to tip workers even when no-tipping signs were
prominent. Second, Defendants' contention that it is
not customary to offer gratuities to coffee servers is
contrary to the record, historical practice, and
current data showing that many patrons favor tipping
in quick service coffee establishments. Scrivanos' notipping policy should therefore be rejected as an
effort to repurpose the Tips Act to serve private
employer interests that are contrary to the
3

Legislature's public policy objective - ensuring that
wait staff receive tips and gratuities intended for
them by customers they serve. Pp. 23-28.
Third, allowing employers covered by the Tips Act
the unfettered right to create no-tipping zones will
have adverse consequences for low-wage workers and the
Commonwealth. Banning tipping will depress the already
meager income of thousands of low-wage front-line food
service workers. Legitimating Defendants' policy would
also increase the number of low-wage workers who are
compelled to rely on federal and state public
assistance programs to meet basic food and housing
needs, placing unnecessary burdens on Massachusetts
taxpayers. P. 29.
Plaintiffs are representative of a sub-set of
workers who hold jobs at the bottom of the 21st century
labor market. The fast-food sector, with profits of
more than $7.4 billion in 2013, operates on a highprofit/low-wage business model that employs over 2.2
million low-wage workers. These employees experience
high rates of under-employment and earn incomes that
cannot provide a family with a living wage in major
urban areas like Boston.

4

Because tips make a real difference in income for
these workers - raising wages by 15% or more - notipping policies will tend to push more working people
into poverty and burden taxpayers who underwrite the
cost of social safety net programs. Almost $7 billion
is spent yearly to underwrite the cost of federal
public assistance programs for fast-food workers. P.
29-38.
This disproportionate reliance on public
assistance is accompanied by an inordinately high-rate
of non-compliance with wage and hour law in the fastfood sector. Indeed, the Defendants' practices of
throwing tips into the garbage and using tips to cover
purported cash register shortages is part and parcel
of the low-road practices that the Tips Act and other
wage and hour laws are designed to combat. P. 39-41.
Finally, Defendants' no-tipping policy is
irrational from an economic standpoint. The Superior
Court judge indicated that the no-tipping policy
prevented Defendants from remaining competitive with
other quick-service coffee establishments that permit
tipping and comply with the Tips Act. What's more,
there is no record evidence or social science
literature indicating that that economic realities or
5

competitive pressures 'push' employers like Defendants
to engage in the illegal behavior at issue. Pp. 41-42
No-tipping policies serve no rational public
purpose and conflict with the language and public
purpose underlying the Tips Act. The Court should
therefore find that Defendants' no-tipping policies
are impermissible under the Tips Act. Pp. 42-44.

INTEREST OF THE AMICI

The University of Massachusetts Labor Relations
and Research Center ("Center"), founded in 1964, as an

integrated program of graduate education, research,
and direct service to workers and the labor movement.
A primary concern addressed by the Labor Center's
research and educational missions is the decline of
collective bargaining and the rise of inequality that
has accompanied the rapid growth of precarious forms
of non-standard and contingent employment.

To this

end, the Center initiated a Future of Work Project in
2004 to provide labor and government policy-makers
with fact-driven research that examines the growth of
the low-wage, contingent labor force as well as the

6

economic and technological forces that are driving
this development.
The Labor Center, along with labor centers at
other University of Massachusetts campuses, has funded
research and published a series of books and reports
on the future of work. The Center also sponsored
numerous conferences attended by hundreds of labor
advocates and government officials where these issues
were discussed and debated.
The Future of Work Project complements two other
of the Center's research areas.

A Labor-Community

Research Project explores how unions and communitybased groups can mobilize in partnership to address
labor market shifts, plant-closings, subcontracting,
with particular emphasis on how these problems impact
low-wage workers, persons of color, women and
immigrants.

The Center has also developed a strategic

corporate research program allows unions and their
allies to efficiently access and analyze comprehensive
corporate business data to facilitate their responses
the shifting terrain in which labor union organizing
and collective bargaining are taking place .
The Massachusetts Fair Wage Campaign ("FWC") is a
coalition of non-profit immigrants' and workers'
7

rights organizations that engage in a range of legal
and policy advocacy, community organizing, and support
and referrals for legal action for low-wage immigrant
workers in Massachusetts.

Most of the FWC

organizations are community-based groups that work
closely with low-wage immigrant workers who are
victims of exploitative and abusive employment
practices, including nonpayment of wages and violation
of state and federal minimum wage and overtime laws,
as well as the Massachusetts tips law. Greater Boston
Legal Services ("GBLS"), counsel to these
organizations, provides legal representation and
assistance to the organizations in their ongoing
efforts to advise and support workers in the
enforcement of their workplace rights.

GBLS also

brings to its representation of the FWC organizations
its own extensive experience representing low-wage
workers in a wide range of cases under the
Massachusetts wage laws.
The participating FWC organizations are the
Brazilian Immigrant Center, Brazilian Women's Group,
Centro Presente, Chelsea Collaborative, Chinese
Progressive Association, Justice at Work,
Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational Safety and
8

Health (MassCOSH), Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee
Advocacy Coalition (MIRA), Massachusetts Jobs with
Justice, and Metrowest Worker Center.

ARGUMENT

Employer-imposed no-tipping policies that prevent
wait staff and covered service employees from
receiving tips or gratuities from patrons are at odds
with the Massachusetts Tips Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
149, §152A, and undermine its legislative purpose.
Employer-mandated no-tipping rules also have hidden
social costs that contribute to fast-food workers and
over-the-counter wait staff like the Plaintiffs
relying on taxpayer-funded public benefit programs at
twice the rate of other employed workers.
I.

EMPLOYER NO-TIPPING POLICIES ARE PROHIBITED BY
THE PROVISIONS OF THE TIPS ACT AND ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC POLICIES THAT GUIDE
THE LEGISLATURE'S ENACTMENT OF WAGE AND HOUR LAWS
The Tips Act expressly protects the wages and

tips of three groups of non-supervisory employees: 1)
"wait staff" who work in restaurants, banquet
facilities or "other places where food or beverages
are served;" 2)

"service bartenders" who prepare

beverages served by wait staff, as well as; 3) other
9

"service employees" who provide services directly to
customers and customarily receive tips or gratuities.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §152A(a); DiFiore v. American
Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 492

(2009).

There is no dispute as to Plaintiffs' status as
protected employees under §152A(a) of the Tips Act.
Defendants nevertheless argue that an employer can
lawfully prevent the Plaintiffs and other covered
employees from receiving tips from patrons by enacting
a no-tipping policy at its Dunkin' Donuts outlets.
Scrivanos Brief at 19-20. Defendants' illogical
construction of the Tips Act cannot be squared with
the salient provisions of this law, the rules of
statutory construction this Court has adopted to
determine the meaning of remedial statutory schemes,
or the legislative purpose of the Tips Act.
A.

Employer-Imposed Tipping Bans Are in
Conflict with the Tips Act's Definitions of
Protected Employees and Tips Voluntarily
Offered Patrons
Nothing in the text of §152A(a) of the Tips Act

, allows employees who fall within the ambit of this
statute to be removed from its protections by
employers who proclaim that their food service
establishment is a no-tipping zone. Yet, Scrivanos
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contends otherwise, asserting that "in those contexts
in which employers choose to prohibit tipping, the
employees do not customarily receive tips and,
therefore, do not fall within the protection of the
statute." Scrivanos Brief at 19-20.
The purported legality of employer-imposed notipping policies hinge on the illogical proposition
that the Tips Act's statutory mandates are employeroptional and may be completely disregarded whenever an
employer imposes a no-tipping rule on its protected
workforce. Such a reading of the Tips Act, however,
disregards the "Legislature's considered judgment"
that the Tips Act be interpreted sensibly. See
DiFiore, 486 Mass. at 490)

(further citations omitted)

("rejecting unreasonable interpretations unless clear
meaning of the statutory language requires such an
interpretation").
Section 152A(a), which defines who is a covered
employee and employer, does not cede to employers the
right to determine whether a covered employee is
entitled to receive tips customarily offered by
patrons. Scrivanos' argument - that tipping bans are
consistent with the Act - disregards this definition,
which explains that tips are a portion of a covered
11

employee's wage determined by a voluntary social norm,
i.e., by custom, not employer policy. 1 This is clear
from the text of §152A(a), which provides that tips are
"given [by patrons] as an acknowledgment of any
service performed by a wait staff employee, service
employee, or service bartender."
The Tips Act cannot be sensibly construed to
allow employer no-tipping policies without ignoring
the fact that the Legislature designed the Act to
"ensure that" protected employees "receive the tips,
gratuities, and service charges that customers intend
for them to receive." DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 491
(emphasis added) . The Legislature enacted the Tips Act
not only to prevent employers from "demanding,
accepting or requesting tips"

[.

.]

"given to" wait

staff by patrons, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §152A(a),
but also to preclude employers from enacting policies
that preemptively interfere with a patron's intended

1

The Act is intended to protect the customary practice of
patron tipping for all non-supervisory wait staff
employees, service bartenders and also for service
employees who "provide services directly to customers or
consumers" but work in occupations "other than in food or
beverage service where "employees customarily receive tips
or gratuities." Mass. Gen . Laws ch. 149, §152A(a).
12

offer of a tip or gratuity to a protected employee.
See

DiFiore~

454 Mass. at 491.

Remedial statutes such as the Tips Act and the
other fair labor standards codified in Chapter 149 of
the General Laws, are to be liberally construed "with
some imagination as to the purposes which lie behind
them." DePianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int '1. , Inc.,
465 Mass . 607, 620 (2013)
Co. v. Yensavage,

(quoting Lehigh Valley Coal

218 F.547, 553

denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915)).

(2d Cir. 1914), cert.

It is therefore

unimaginable that the Legislature enacted a law that
is designed to ensure that protected workers receive
the tips and gratuities intended for them, but also
allowed for a silent, unwritten provision that permits
employers to opt-out of the law simply by posting a
sign in their establishment that proclaims, "Thank You
For Not Tipping." See Memorandum of Decision and Order
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, SUCV201101849-BLS1 at 11 (J. Billings Sept. 11, 2013).
Given that the Defendants have not identified any
provision of the Tips Act that expressly or impliedly
allows employers to ban tipping, their contention that
the Tips Act permits tipping bans poses another
troubling problem: "[I]t requires [this Court] to add
13

words to the statute that the Legislature did not see
fit to put there." Cooney v. Compass Group
Foodservice, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 638 (2007)
(interpreting ch.149, §152A prior to a 2004
Legislative amendment).
There is, of course, language in the Tips Act
that shields certain tip-related employer practices
from sanction. In 2004, the Legislature amended the
Tips Act by adding §152A(d) to expressly permit
employers to impose a "house or administrative fee in
addition to or instead of a service charge or tip" as
long as "the employer provides a designation or
written description of that house or administrative
fee, which informs the patron that the fee does not
represent a tip or service charge intended" for
protected employees. See Bednark v. Catania
Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 808 n.
8 and 812

( 2 0 11 ) .

By creating §152A(d), which the Appeals Court
labeled as a "safe harbor provision," the Legislature
indicated that it knew how to craft provisions to
protect certain employer business practices that
operate in the sphere of conduct that the Tips Act
regulates. See Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 808 n. 8
14

and 812. However, unlike the express safe harbor
provision in §152A(d), no section of the Tips Act
contains any language condoning, permitting or
creating safe harbor for employer policies that would
punish a protected employee who accepted a patron's
tip or permit an employer to post signs banning
voluntary tipping of employees by patrons. For this
reason, and contrary to the Superior Court's view,
"clearly and conspicuously announced" no-tipping
policies are in no way consistent with the Tips Act.
See Meshna v. Scrivanos, Memorandum of Decision and
Order on Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 313, at *2, C.A. No.
2011-01849-BLS1 (J. Fabricant Dec. 21, 2011).
In short, no part of §152A(a), which defines who
is a covered employee and what constitutes a tip,
provides support for the argument that an employer can
take it upon itself to decide whether covered
employees are entitled to receive tips voluntarily
offered by patrons. See Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at
809 (quoting DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 486)

(language and

history of Tips Act indicate Legislature's intent: "to
ensure that service employees receive the tips,

15

gratuities, and service charges that customers intend
them to receive")
B.

(emphasis in original).

Employer-Imposed No-Tipping Policies
Conflict with the Tip Act's Prohibition of
Employers' Efforts to Exempt Themselves from
the Law.
Scrivanos' no-tipping policy is also at odds with

§152A(g) of the Tips Act, which was added by the
Legislature in 2004 to strengthen the statutory
provision in the original Tips Act that "rendered
unenforceable" employer-initiated agreements that
required employees to turn their tips over to the
employer. DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 493. Section 152A(g)
now provides even broader protections, stating that
"[n]o employer or person shall by a special contract
with an employee or by any other means exempt itself
from this section."
This Court has repeatedly explained that by
enacting §152A(g)

"the Legislature was cognizant, in

general, of the risk that employers or other persons
may seek to find ways [... ] to attempt to avoid
compliance with the Act, and intended to thwart such
schemes." DeFiore, 454 Mass. at 497; see also
DePianti, 465 Mass. at 623

(2013). More specifically,

DeFiore held that 152A(g) banned a subcontracting

16

scheme that restaurants and airlines used "to avoid
the mandates of the statute by outsourcing the
services of wait staff and service employees, and
contractually requiring the outsource employer to
remit to the restaurant or airlines all or part of the
service charges." 454 Mass. at 496. This practice was
found to be an unlawful "end-run" around the Tips Act.
Id.

Scrivanos' no-tipping policy is yet another
"end run" around the Tips Act that cannot be squared
with §152A(g)'s ban on the use of "special contracts"
or "any other means" to exempt employers from the
requirements of the Tips Act. Whether termed a
"special contract" or some "other means" of thwarting
the Act's goal, Scrivanos' ban on tipping cannot be
squared with a sensible reading of §152A(g), a
provision intended to ensure that covered employees
receive tips intended for them by patrons. See
DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 490-491

omitted)

(further citations

(rejecting interpretations of the Tips Act

that ignore judicially-approved use of language,
statutory purpose and the employer mischief to be
remedied).

17

Yet, Scrivanos' no-tipping rule is indisputably
part of his employees' at-will contracts. It is
included in the franchises' personnel handbooks and
posted in public areas of its Dunkin' Donuts stores.
Defendants also reserve the right to punish wait staff
employees if they accept a tip intended for them by a
patron or if they fail to convey the no-tipping policy
to patrons who leave change on the counter, intending
it to be a tip. Indeed, Scrivanos has fired employees
for violating this contractual term of employment.
Meshna v. Scrivanos, Memorandum of Decision and Order
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, SUCV2011-

01849-BLS1 at 9, 10.
The no-tipping policy is surely a contractual
means of banning tipping as it imposes no enforceable
rule on patrons, only on Dunkin' Donuts wait staff.
Nothing in the record indicates that, pursuant to its
no-tipping policy, Scrivanos reserved the right to
exclude or remove patrons who intend to or in fact do
leave tips for wait staff. As such, the no-tipping
signs at Scrivanos' Dunkin' Donuts are no more than a
public display of its employment policy that serves
the purpose of putting its wait staff on notice that

18

they may be punished or terminated for receiving a
gratuity from a patron.
Notably, neither Scrivanos' brief nor the
Superior Court's rulings reference, much less attempt
to reconcile, the no-tipping policy at issue
wit§152A(g). Rather, the Superior Court decision
skirted §152A{g) and adopted Scrivanos' argument that
an employer can choose to create a tip-free zone at
its restaurant to avoid "the administrative burden of
accounting for tips and distributing them among those
employees entitled to receive them" or to avoid "the
risk of liability" for violations of the Tips Act.
Meshna, Memorandum of Decision and Order on
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 29
Mass. L. Rptr. 313 at *3-4 & n. 3. Finding no support
for this argument in the statutory text, the Superior
Court illogically cites DiFiore and Bednark to support
its assertion that,

"conspicuously announced," no-

tipping policies preclude any reasonable customer
expectations that money offered as tips would "go to
employees." Id. at *2.
The Superior Court's reasoning should be rejected
as it misapprehends the analysis in DiFiore and
Bednark. The underlying concern in DiFiore, 454 Mass.
19

at 494, and Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 815, was to
outlaw employer mislabeling of service fees that
misled customers by suggesting to them that the fees
they paid to the employer were gratuities intended for
covered employees.
More specifically, DiFiore addressed the proper
definition of the term "service charge" in §152A(a) in
response to a certified question from a Massachusetts
Federal District Court. 454 Mass. at 487. This Court
explained that the proper starting point in defining
this term was to recognize that "the Legislature
intended to ensure that service employees receive all
the proceeds from service charges." 454 Mass. at 493
(finding that the Legislature wished definitions to be
interpreted to serve, not thwart, legislative purpose
underlying Tips Act). Accordingly, DiFiore rejected
definitions of the terms "service charge" and
"employer" that would have permitted an airline to use
a subcontracting scheme to avoid remitting a service
charge to baggage handlers. Id. at 494.
In Bednark, a hotel employer argued that any
charge to patrons designated by the employer as an
"administrative fee" is by definition not a gratuity
or service charge as defined by §152A(a), which allows

20

the employer to retain the fee pursuant to §152A(d),
the Tip Act's safe harbor provision. 78 Mass. App. Ct.
at 815-816. Accordingly, this Court held that the
hotel could not take advantage of §152A(d) when it
charged customers for certain costs that it blithely
labeled as an "administrative fee," without further
written explanation or description. Id. at 806.
Scrivanos' no-tipping policy receives neither
support nor protection from DiFiore or Bednark, both
of which condemned employer mislabeling schemes and
policies that thwarted the ability of patrons to leave
gratuities for covered employees if that is their
intent. See Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 815-816
(requiring various provisions of Tips Act be
interpreted harmoniously to preserve their "patroncentric focus"). The Dunkin' Donuts no-tipping policy
- whether or not it is conspicuously announced to
patrons or clearly conveyed to employees - has the
same unlawful effect on patron behavior and the right
of covered employees to receive gratuities as the
employer schemes rejected by DiFiore and Bednark,
i.e., it prevents patrons from offering, and covered
employees from receiving, tips.

21

What the trial court's defense of Scrivanos' notipping policy fails to recognize is that the Tips
Act, like all wage and hour legislation, contains
provisions that abrogate certain aspects of the atwill employment contract, to wit, the employer's right
to impose on its employees certain terms of the wage
bargain that are contrary to statutory enactment and
underlying legislative policy. Parrish v. West Coast
Hotel, 300 U.S. 379, 392
562, 566-567 ( 193 9)

(1937); Akins Case, 302 Mass.

(contractual terms of employment

are subordinate to right of the State to safeguard the
public interest). Here, §152A(g) states that employers
may not "by special contract [ . . . ] or other means
exempt itself" from the Tips Act. Given this clear
language, "it is the function of the judiciary to
apply it, not amend it." Cooney, 439 Mass. App. Ct. at
638

(quoting Commissioner of Rev. v. Cargill, 429

Mass. 79, 82 (1999)).

II.

THE TIPS ACT DOES NOT SANCTION EMPLOYER NOTIPPING POLICIES AS A LAWFUL BUSINESS RESPONSE TO
CUSTOMER DEMAND OR PREFERENCE
The argument that the Tips Act permits employer-

imposed tipping bans is, in effect, an attempt to
repurpose the Tips Act to serve private policy

22

objectives that are at odds with the legislative goals
underlying the Commonwealth's wage and hour laws.
Scrivanos contends that employers should be allowed to
ban tipping "primarily in response to concerns voiced
by [.

.] customers who did not want to feel

pressured to leave tips and wanted to receive the same
service regardless of their ability or desire to leave
a tip." Scrivanos Brief at 6. However, Scrivanos
offers slim anecdotal evidence and virtually no case
law or any legislative policy to support the view that
no-tipping policies may be enacted because some
patrons do not like to tip.
A.

When Viewed in a Light Most Favorable to the
Plaintiffs, the Record Cannot Be Construed
to Support the Notion That Tipping Bans Are
a Reasoned Business Response to Market
Forces.
Defendants' argument conveniently ignores the

undisputed fact that over one-third of the Dunkin'
Donuts franchises they own permit tipping. Meshna
Brief at 7. Notably, there is no claim that these
stores suffered any economic disadvantage.

What's

more, Scrivanos offers no explanation for why it
disregards the viewpoint of those customers who choose

23

to leave tips when patronizing Dunkin Donuts stores,
even when they are informed of the no-tipping policy.
Instead, Defendants contend that its no-tipping
policy is a reasoned business response to some of its
customers'

'discomfort' with, and/or viewpoints

regarding, customary tipping. Basing one's business
practices on customer preferences that compel
violation of extant workplace laws is, however,
without legal support. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts Co.,
452 Mass. 674

(2008)

(rejecting employer's undue

hardship defense; holding customer preferences for
clean-shaven employees does not justify employer
engaging in religious discrimination against unshaven
Rastafarian) .
B.

The Facts and Historical Practice Establish
that Coffee Servers and Counter Wait Staff
Customarily Receive Tips from Patrons.
The record does not support Scrivanos' claim that

customary tipping has not taken root at Dunkin' Donuts
and other establishments where employees serve
beverages from behind the counter (as opposed to
waiting on tables) . A brief review of the origins and
history of the custom of tipping explains why
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Scrivanos cannot substantiate the claim that it is not
"customary" to offer gratuities to coffee servers.
The centuries-old custom of tipping can be traced
to Tudor England where overnight guests provided a sum
of money directly to their host's servants as
compensation for the extra work of caring for more
than the usual number of guests. Kerry Seagrave, TIPPING
AN

AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY OF GRATUITIES, 1- 6

( 19 9 8)

The

practice soon made its way to coffeehouses,
restaurants and other commercial establishments.
at 4. In fact,

Id.

some historians believe that the term

"tip" is an acronym for the phrase 'To Insure
Promptitude," which English author Samuel Johnson
inscribed on a bowl at a coffeehouse he frequented in
the 1700's. Id.

2

Wealthier Americans began the custom of tipping
after the Civil War, perhaps as a means of
demonstrating their familiarity with and approval of
European customs. Steve Dublanica, KEEP THE CHANGE: A
CLUELESS TIPPERS QUEST TO BECOME THE GURU OF THE GRATUITY, 15 -16
2

0ther historians consider the Samuel Johnson/tips acronym
story to be an early urban myth. Steve Dublanica, author of
KEEP THE CHANGE: A CLUELESS TIPPERS QUEST TO BECOME THE GURU OF THE
GRATUITY (2010), claims that the term tip has an older
origin. "As far back as 1509, Albrecht Durer, the German
painter and printer, wrote a letter asking one of his
customers to give his apprentice a trinkgeld, or tip." Id.
at 14.
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(2010).

Although tipping was a controversial social

practice when introduced to America - as it was
thought to be an anathema to a society founded on
social equality - by 1926, tipping had become a norm
in America's food service industry. 3 Yoram Margailoth,
The Case Against Tipping,

121

9 U. PA. J. LAB. &

EMP

L. 117,

(2006) .
Even legal scholars who question the social

utility of tipping recognize that it is now customary
for patrons served by low-wage counter-staff and
baristas at the innumerable coffee bars and juice
joints that now pepper America's downtowns and
shopping areas. See, e.g., id. at 121 (2006)

("Tipping

has become quintessentially American" and "in today's
coffeehouses and juice joints, with their 'tip jars,'
[tipping]

has become de rigueur") . 4 Moreover, the

3

The restaurant industry quickly took advantage of the
custom of tipping and generally required wait staff to live
on tips alone.
In fact, the restaurant industry has a long
history of hostility to minimum wage laws, lobbying
Congress to deny restaurant employees coverage under FLSA.
Tips and Poverty, New York Times, Op-ed, Sept. 14,2013
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/tips-andpoverty.html?_r=O. Only in 1966, when the FLSA was amended,
did a 'sub-minimum' wage -then set at fifty percent of the
minimum wage - become required for wait-staff to supplement
tipped earnings. See 29 U.S.C. §203(m).
4 see also Emily Post, iconic mainstay of American
etiquette, stating on its website: "Tip occasionally if
your server or barista provides a little something extra or
if you are a regular customer." Emily Post General Tipping
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ubiquity of tipping in over-the-counter coffee service
restaurants is consistent with the record in this
case, which is peppered with facts indicating that
Dunkin' patrons routinely attempted to tip employees,
even in the face of Scrivanos' no-tipping policies.
See infra at 35-37.

Furthermore, neither the record in this case or
social science research supports the view that the
practice of customary tipping is on the way out.
Rather, new forms of digital commerce are now being
shaped by patrons' strong desire to leave tips for
low-wage coffee servers and other behind-the-counter
wait staff. Most notably, Starbucks has included a
mobile-tipping option on the newest version of its
smartphone "app," responding to "demand from
customers, many of who no longer carry around much
cash." Candace Choi, Tipping Can Be Touchy, But App
Wi 11 Make i t Easy, BOSTON GLOBE/ ASSOCIATED PRESS, March

13,2014, 2014 WLNR 6815972 (mobile-tipping, in amounts
of fifty cents, one dollar or two dollars, is an
option at 7,000 out of 11,000 Starbucks nationwide as
of March 19, 2014).

Guidelines, http://www.emilypost.com/ out-andabout/tipping/89-general-tipping-guidelines (last visited
April 12, 2014).
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In sum, there is no support in the law, the facts
of this dispute or in social science literature for
the view that patrons do not customarily tip at
Dunkin' Donuts franchise outlets or other similarly
situated over-the-counter, quick service, food and
beverage restaurants.

III. NO-TIPPING POLICIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE LOW-WAGE WORKFORCE AND
FOIST THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF TIPPING
BANS ONTO THE CITIZEN-TAX PAYERS OF MASSACHUSETTS
Scrivanos' argument that employers of food
service wait staff should enjoy the unfettered right
to create no-tipping zones in their establishments
callously ignores the fact that no-tipping policies
will surely depress the already meager income of
thousands of low-wage, front-line wait staff and food
service workers throughout Massachusetts. Moreover,
no-tipping policies that lower the earned income of
behind-the-counter wait staff have hidden social costs
that increase the number of low-wage workers driven to
depend on myriad federal and state public assistance
programs.
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A.

Socio-Economic Data Establishes That Tips
Received by Dunkin' Donuts Wait Staff and
Other Similarly Situated Workers Are an
Important Part of Employee Compensation.
Any inquiry into the real-world impact of no-

tipping policies invites close examination of the
restaurant industry, which employs over 10 million
workers or 9 percent of the total U.S. workforce.
According to the National Restaurant Association
(NRA), the industry is thriving; total sales revenues
for 2013 was $660.5 billion, almost double the
industry's revenues in 2000. Rosemary Batt, et al., A
National Study of Human Resource Practices, Turnover
and Customer Service in the Restaurant Industry 5,

http://rocunited.org/a-national-study-of-humanresource-practices-turnover-and-customer-service-inthe-restaurant-industry/ (citing National Restaurant
Association website 2013; U.S. DOL, Bureau of Labor
Standards 2012)

(last visited March 17, 2014)

[hereinafter "ROC United Restaurant Study"].
Yet, seven of the ten lowest-paid occupations are
in restaurant occupations. Id.

(citing DOL, Bureau of

Labor Statistics data) . The average yearly income for
restaurant workers nationwide in 2009 was $15,092,
compared to $45,155 for the total private sector.
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Median hourly wage in the industry, including tips, is
only $8.89. ROC United, Behind the Kitchen Door: A
Multi-site Study of the Restaurant Industry,

http://rocunited.org/2011-behind-the-kitchen-doormulti-site-study/ (2011)

(last visited on October 15,

2014). Moreover, low pay in this industry has had a
disparate impact on racial minorities. According to
ROC United's survey in eight major urban areas, the
disparity in the median wage of whites as compared to
workers of color is $13.59 as compared to $9.54. This
$3.71 per hour differential is stark evidence of
widespread racial inequality in the restaurant
industry. Id.

5

The vast majority of restaurant workers, 87
percent, have no sick leave. Id. And the large number
of low wage jobs in this sector makes the restaurant
industry "particularly prone to minimum wage and hours
of work violations." David Weil, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE:
WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO

5

The wages of restaurant workers are also substantially
lower than the wages earned by demographically similar
workers in other industries. Percentage-wise, a typical
restaurant worker suffers a 'wage penalty' for working in
this industry of 17.2 percent. Heidi Shierholz, Low wages
and few Benefits mean many restaurant workers can't make
ends meet, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #383,
16-17, http://www.epi.org/publication/restaurantworkers/(last visited on August 29, 2014).
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IMPROVE IT,

130 (2014)

(18.2 percent experience minimum

wage violations; 69.7 percent overtime violations;
74.2 percent off-the-clock violations; also noncompliance with wage and hour laws higher in
franchised outlets); see also Behind the Kitchen Door,
supra, at 29 (almost half of restaurant workers
surveyed report overtime violations) .
The restaurant industry's high-profit/low-wage
business model is most pronounced in the fastfood/quick service sector where the ten largest
companies employ more than 2.25 million mostly lowwage workers while earning profits of $7.44 billion in
2013. Super-sizing Public Costs: How Low Wages at
Fast-Food Chains Leave Taxpayers Footing the Bill,
National Employment Law Project Data Brief,
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/rtmw/uploads/NELP-SuperSizing-Public-Costs-Fast-Food-Report.pdf?nocdn=1,
Oct., 2013

(last visited October 15, 2014)

[hereinafter "Super-sizing Public Costs"]. Dunkin'
Donuts ranks sixth on that list, employing more than
160,000 employees at over 7300 franchise outlets
nationwide. Id.
Dunkin' Donut employees and other front-line
fast-food service workers, comprise the very bottom of
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the restaurant industry's low-wage workforce. This is
the conclusion of a 2013 national study undertaken by
the University of California, Berkeley, Center for
Labor Research and Education and the Department of
Urban and Regional Planning, University of Illinois
(Urbana-Champaign) . See Sylvia A. Allegretto, PhD, et
al., Fast Food, Poverty Wages: The Public Cost of Low-

Wage Jobs in the Fast-Food Industry, http://
laborcenter.berkeley.edu/publiccosts/fast_food
_poverty_wages.pdf

(last visited March 13, 2014)

[hereinafter "Fast Food, Poverty Wages"] .
Consider that in 2010 the typical fast-food
worker lucky enough to work a 40-hour week for an
entire year makes only $18,130. 6 Bureau of Labor

Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational
Outlook Handbook, 2014-15 Edition, Food and Beverage
Serving and Related Workers, http://www.bls.gov/
ooh/food-preparation-and-serving/food-and-beverage-

6

The Massachusetts Economic Independence Index estimates
that an adult in Massachusetts needs to earn about $28,500
annually to remain economically independent, and a singleparent family with one preschooler and one school-age
child needs an income of $65,880 a year to meet its day-today essential expenses without public assistance. Michael
W. Ames, et al., Massachusetts Economic Independence Index,
Crittenton Women's Union, http://www.liveworkthrive.org/
research_and_tools/reports_and_publications/Massachusetts_E
conomic_Independence_Index_2013 (last visited March 18,
2014) .
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serving-and-related-workers.htm (visited October 15,
2014). But, for the vast majority of this workforce,
full-time work is the exception rather than the rule.
Less than a third - just 28 percent - of front-line
fast-food workers work a 40-hour week. Id. at 8-9. The
median workweek is actually far less, only 30 hours,
and 12 percent of the fast-food workforce is employed
for only 10-20 hours per week, compared to 4 percent
of the total workforce. The median wage for Dunkin'
Donuts employees and other front-line fast-food
workers is $8.69 an hour. 7 Only 13 percent of these
workers receive employer-provided health care,
compared to 59 percent of the overall workforce. Id.
As a consequence of this low-wage, no-benefit and
limited, low-hours business model, households that
include an employed, front-line fast-food worker are
four times as likely to live below the federal poverty
level. 8 See id.

(5 percent of households in poverty

compared to 20 percent for households with fast-food
workers) . Not surprisingly, fast-food and quick
7

This figure is for a front-line fast-food worker employed
for at least 27 weeks per year and 10 hours per week. Fast
Food, Poverty Wages at 8. As discussed, for most fast-food
workers, the 40-hour workweek is beyond their reach.
8
The federal poverty level for a family of four is $23,850
and $11,670 for a single person. U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services, http://aspe.hhs.gov /poverty/14poverty.cfm
(last visited May 19, 2014).

33

service restaurants have annual employee turnover
rates of 45 percent and the typical tenure is only 3.6
years, creating inordinate levels of churning and wage
loss in the low-wage workforce and increased business
costs for franchise owners. See Roc United Restaurant
Study at 2, 17-20.
Contrary to popular wisdom, the fast-food
workforce is not primarily comprised of teenagers and
'stay-at-home-moms,' whose earnings are supplemental
to their families' primary source of income. Over twothirds of the front-line fast-food workers are single
or married adults. Id. at 10. The average age is
twenty-four and more than one-third of fast-food this
workers over twenty years old are raising children.
Id. at 9-10.
Given the pervasive poverty-level and nearpoverty level incomes of fast-food workers at
franchise outlets of Dunkin' Donuts, McDonald's,
Subway, Domino's and other franchised quick-service
restaurants, it is patent that any amount received in
tips can make a significant difference in employee
earnings. This is evident from the judgment in
Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 2011 WL 1002740 (D.
Mass. March 18, 2011), aff'd. 699 F.3d 129 (1st Cir.
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2012), in which Starbucks wait staff received a $14
million judgment to remedy Starbucks violation of
§152A(c) of the Tips Act by unlawfully including
supervisory employees in tip pools. This sum premised on Starbucks coffee servers earning an
additional $2 per hour in tips - provides a useful
comparator to assess the potential income that Dunkin
Donuts' workers are losing as a result of Scrivanos'
no-tipping policy. See Matamoros, Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment on Damages, C.A. No. 1:08-cv10772, Dkt. No 79. 9

An employee receiving tips

amounting to $2 per hour would increase her yearly
earnings by $3,000 if that fast-food worker was
employed for 30 hours a week. Indeed, this is a 25
percent hourly raise for a fast - food worker making the
minimum wage of $8/hour.
The undisputed testimony of the Plaintiffs in
this case provides further reason to reject Scrivanos'
claim that tips are not "an important part" of

9 Moreover,

following the First Circuit's ruling, Starbucks
increased the starting wage for shift supervisors in its
Massachusetts outlets by almost $3 per hour (from $11.00 to
$13.89) in order to make up for the tips that supervisors
could no longer earn. Lisa Jennings, Starbucks restructures
'shift supervisor' position in Mass., NATION's RESTAURANT NEWS ,
http://nrn.com/latest-headlines/starbucks-restructures shift-supervisor-position-mass, Jan. 29, 2013 (last visited
March 17, 2014) .
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employee compensation at his Dunkin' Donuts stores.
See Scrivanos Brief at 23

(Dunkin' Donuts employees do

not "rely on tips as part of their compensation"). Ron
Meshna indicated that patrons would leave tips ranging
from a penny to five dollars at the North Reading
Dunkin' store. Meshna v. Scrivanos, Memorandum of
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, C.A. No. 2011-01849-BLS1 at 13 (Sept. 11,
2013 Billings, J.)
Ralph Sherrick stated that at the Dunkin' Donuts
Peabody location "on many occasions" patrons left
money on the counter and told him to "keep the
change." Id. at 14. In the Lynnfield Dunkin' Donuts
store, Ileana Ortiz reported that customers would
insist on leaving change at the drive-in window and on
the counter even when told that tips were "not
allowed." Id. at 14-15. In Haverhill's Dunkin' Donuts,
Karen White indicates that regular customers who live
in the neighborhood and frequent the store routinely,
came in at Christmas time and gave "substantial tips
because they knew we had been providing them with good
service." Id. at 15.
The evolution of Scrivanos' "Abandoned Change Cup"
policy underscores just how prevalent and potentially
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substantial tip income from Dunkin' Donuts patrons
could be. See generally id. at 16-18. When so-called
"abandoned change" cups were first placed on the
counter in the Peabody Dunkin' Donuts store, patrons
responded generously as they thought the cups were for
leaving tips. See id.

(Sherrick was instructed "at

least once" by management to empty "an overflowing
abandoned change cup into the register").
It was only after management put signs on the cups
indicating they were not for tips that,
days [.

"[a]fter a few

.] , the problem of overflowing change in the

cups ceased." Id. at 17. The fact that it took "a few
days" to quell the flow of change indicates that, even
when management attempted to stop the practice,
customers still demonstrated a desire to tip Dunkin'
Donuts wait staff.
B.

Employer-Imposed Tipping Bans Have Hidden
Public Costs That Burden Social Safety Net
Programs Administered and Funded by
Commonwealth Taxpayers.
The low wages and insufficient work hours of wait

staff employees in fast-food restaurants also have
hidden social costs that are not reflected in the
record of this case.

More than half of front-line

fast-food workers rely on one or more public
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assistance programs to support themselves and their
families. Fast Food, Poverty Wages at 1, 6-9. Fastfood workers participate in these programs at more
than twice the rate of all employed workers. In other
words,

"public benefits receipt is the rule, rather

than the exception for this workforce." Id. at 6, 10.
The cost to taxpayers is staggering: almost $7
billion is spent each year to provide federally
sponsored public assistance programs to families of
workers in the fast-food industry. Id. More than
432,000 families of fast-food workers (a 45 percent
participation rate) receive $1.04 billion in food
stamps. Id. at 7. Over 800,000 families of fast-food
workers use the Earned Income Tax Credit, costing
taxpayers $1.91 billion. Medicaid participation for
families of fast - food workers with adult enrollment is
19 percent and for families with children it is 18
percent. The cost for both is almost $4 billion a
year.
In fact, U.S. taxpayers underwrite the low-wages
paid to Dunkin' Donuts wait staff in the amount of
$274 million in annual public assistance benefits.
Super-sizing Public Costs, supra, at 31. That breaks

down to $1704 for each of the more than 7000 employees
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at Dunkin' franchise outlets. It takes little
imagination to understand that employer-imposed
tipping bans can only contribute to raising the hidden
public costs that taxpayers assume for the already low
wages paid to quick service coffee servers and other
fast-food workers.
No-tipping policies and employer appropriation of
employee tips are part and parcel of a pattern of wage
and hour law violations that are now endemic in the
restaurant industry. Just last fiscal year, the Boston
office of the U.S. Department of Labor conducted 165
investigations into the restaurant industry that
resulted in more than $1.7 million in back wages. See
For many Restaurant Workers, Fair Conditions Not on
Menu, THE BosToN GLOBE, op-ed, Feb. 16, 2 014, 2 014 WLNR
4274642.

Consider in this light the patent violations

of the Tips Act that accompanied Scrivanos' no-tipping
policies: demands that Dunkin' Donuts employees "throw
tips into the garbage"; employer use of tips to
purportedly cover employee theft and "shortages" in
the cash register; and pouring entire cups of money
into the cash register that were unquestionably
intended as tips for wait staff. See generally Meshna,
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Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, SUCV2011-01849-BLS1 at 5-19.
The economic realities of this industry lend no
support to any meaningful argument that tipping bans
are born of business necessity. Competitive pressures
do not explain the low-road economic model in the
restaurant sector; the industry is expanding and is
largely immune from the downward push that
international competition creates in other economic
sectors. See For Many Restaurant Workers, Fair
Conditions Not on Menu, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2014,
2014 WLNR 4274642.

The record in this dispute underscores the Globe
editors' point; low-road employment practices "do not
represent an efficient, market-driven distribution of
labor." Id. As Judge Billings noted, the no-tipping
policy actually placed Defendants at a competitive
disadvantage in the labor market of the Metro West
suburbs. Meshna, Memorandum of Decision and Order on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, n. 5.
This resulted in the Defendants withdrawing the no -
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tipping policy at some of its Dunkin outlets "after
receiving pressure from his operations people." Id.

10

In fact, no-tipping policies compromise the well being of the Commonwealth's low-wage workforce and
burden its taxpayers. See Parrish v. West Coast Hotel,
300 U . S. at 399-400 (in which the Supreme Court
famously stated that "[t]he community is not bound to
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable
employers"). It is often forgotten that wage and hour
laws were enacted in the first part of the twentieth
century as part of an industrial policy to end
widespread poverty and cycles of economic decline that
accompanied the modern economy. See Marc Linder, The

Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role,
16 J. OF LEGIS. 151, 151-153

(1990). President Franklin

Roosevelt, in his advocacy for the minimum wage, made
this policy goal very clear by bluntly stating,

"No

business which depends for existence on paying less
than living wages to its workers has any right to

10

The genesis of Scrivanos' withdrawal of his no-tipping
policy at some stores is explained by Judge Billings: "The
problem was that most of the surrounding Dunkin' Donuts
stores in the Metrowest area allowing [sic] tipping, so the
defendants could not find any people to work at his stores,
notwithstanding that they paid employees above minimum wage
and spent over a hundred thousand dollars in advertising.
Scrivanos was even forced to close some stores for want of
staff." Id.
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continue to exist in this country." Robert Follin, et
al .

1

A

MEASURE OF FAIRNESS :

THE ECONOMICS OF LIVING WAGES AND

MINIMUM WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 4

( 2 0 0 8) •

Tipped income is a lifeline for many because
minimum wage jobs are not lifting workers out of
poverty and squalor, much less allowing workers to
live adequately in any major

U.S.

metropolis. The

living wage in Boston, which is now calculated at
$12.65 per hour for a single individual and $22.40 for
a family of four,

is almost 60 per cent higher than

the Commonwealth's minimum wage. 11 See Living Wage

Calculation for Boston, MA., http://livingwage.
mit.edu /places/2502507000(prepared by Dr. Amy K.
Glasmeier and MIT) (last visited March 18, 2014).
However, allowing wait staff to receive patron tips
without employer interference, as envisioned by the
Tips Act and this Court's precedent, provides -- at no
cost to the employer - an immediate, meaningful boost
in earnings for these workers.

Legislation increasing the Massachusetts m~n~mum wage is
scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2015. However, the
minimum wage will not reach even $11 per hour until January
2017. An Act Restoring the Minimum Wage and Providing
Unemployment Insurance Reforms, Ch. 144, §§ 28-36 of the
Acts of the General Court, June 26, 2014.
11
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Given the real impact that tipped income has on
earnings, this Court should reject employer no-tipping
policies, not only because they conflict with the text
and purpose of the Tips Act but also because tipping
bans serve no rational public policy goal.

IV.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Superior Court's

rulings and find that the Defendants' no-tipping
policy violates Section 152A of Chapter 149 of the
General Laws, effectively discouraging patrons from
leaving tips for protected wait staff employees and
prohibiting employees from accepting tips.
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